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of Punishment Behavior
Abstract
We conduct an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment,
responders’ reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting
responders’ (static) resistance to unfairness. In a control treatment, proposers are informed,
allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. Higher rejection rates are observed.
The difference can be attributed to responders’ effort to create a group reputation for being
“tough”. Rejections in the control treatment effectively “educate” proposers. We conclude
that both resistance to unfairness and contribution to group reputation are determinants of
punishment behavior, but neither is sufficient on its own.1
1.  Introduction
In the well-known ultimatum game, one player (the proposer, male pronouns) offers a second
player (the responder, female pronouns) a division of a fixed cake. The responder can either
accept or reject. If she accepts, the proposed division is implemented, if she rejects, both
receive nothing. The subgame perfect equilibrium is straightforward: the responder does not
reject any positive offers, since even the smallest positive payoff is better than receiving zero. In
anticipation of this, the proposer offers no more than the smallest money unit and the responder
accepts. Hence, under the common knowledge of rationality, the proposer virtually grabs the
whole cake for himself.
Subjects’ behavior, however, is different. A large experimental literature starting with GÜTH,
SCHMITTBERGER, and SCHWARZE (1982) has focused on this simple bargaining game, and in
almost all studies dramatic deviations from the subgame perfect prediction are observed
1.
Typically, responders do turn down small offers, and proposers offer substantial amounts of
money, very often up to an equal division of the cake.
Why do responders reject when this just means leaving money on the table? Such behavior is
quite obviously not rational, if subjects are only concerned about own payoffs and the game
is only played once. Thus, one approach to explain rejections in the ultimatum game is to
assume that responders prefer receiving nothing to receiving little, because the rejection cre-
ates an allocation in which the proposer also receives nothing. This approach is related to a
fairness argument: Responders are willing to pay the price of receiving nothing because of
some inherent resistance to unfairness (THALER 1988).
                                        
1  Surveys on ultimatum game experiments are in GÜTH (1994), ROTH (1995), and CAMERER and THALER
(1995).2
However, it is a striking experimental observation that, although responders leave some
money on the table by rejecting low offers, on average they receive greater payoffs than in
subgame perfect equilibrium play. Does this mean that it is not only fairness, but some kind
of monetary self-interest that drives rejection behavior? In repeated play settings, such results
are readily explained in terms of reputation building super-game strategies.
2 In the one-shot
setting of typical ultimatum game experiments, however, reputation building is not possible,
at least not on an individual level. Both the proposer and the responder know that they will
not meet again.
While reputation on individual level cannot explain the success of responders in receiving
payoffs that by far exceed the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in the ultimatum game,
perhaps reputation on group level can. If the population of responders has a group reputation
for being “tough” (i.e. rejecting low offers), then proposers fearing rejections may increase
their offers, thus driving responders’ payoffs up. In this sense, the group reputation may be a
public good for the population of responders and each individual responder can contribute to
this public good by rejecting low offers. Hence, rejections in the ultimatum game may be due
to some form of population rationality, as WINTER and ZAMIR (1996) have suggested.
The hypothesis that rejection behavior is driven by own payoff considerations
3 is challenged
by fairness utility models, such as presented by BOLTON (1991), RABIN (1993), BOLTON and
OCKENFELS (1999), and FEHR and SCHMIDT  (1999). In these models, players are concerned
                                        
2  Reputation effects have been shown to be decisive to outcomes in quite a number of experiments, for exam-
ple: the borrower-lender game studied by CAMERER and WEIGELT (1988), the simple signaling game studied by
BRANDTS and HOLT (1992), the centipede game studied by MCKELVEY and PALFREY (1992), and the chain-
store game studied by JUNG, KAGEL, and LEVIN (1994).
3  Simulation paths of adaptive learning models as studied by ROTH and EREV (1995) also exhibit some of the
features of ultimatum game outcomes. Since rejecting small offers causes smaller losses for the responder than for
the proposer, proposers in these models learn faster not to make small offers than responders learn to accept them.
ABBINK, BOLTON, SADRIEH, and TANG (1996), however, find that simple adaptive learning models do not capture
responder motivations completely. They show that many responders not only care about their own payoffs, but also
about the payoff received by the proposer. To incorporate more sophisticated behavioral structures, adaptive learning
models have been enhanced in a number of ways, e.g. EREV and ROTH (1998) and CAMERER and HO (1999).3
about their own payoff and the “fairness” of the outcome. Although fairness is modeled in
different ways, the common feature is that individuals are assumed to have a disutility of
unfair outcomes. Standard game theoretical methods are applied to games in which players
have such modified utility (or motivation) functions. A remarkably good fit of their models’
predictions to a wide range of different experimental data is reported. The players in these
models, however, are concerned about fairness only in a static manner.
4 Dynamic considera-
tions of decision making, that motivate punishment either as a response to history (reciproc-
ity) or as an investment for future payoffs (group reputation), are not modeled.
Taking the two sides of the coin together, the fundamental open question that we address with
this paper is whether responders’ rejection behavior is driven by fairness motives or by group
reputation. Do responders happen to earn more because they want to reject unfair offers or do
they reject unfair offers only because they want to earn more?
In this paper, we introduce the covered response ultimatum game which allows us to separate
static from dynamic motives across treatments. The simple modification we apply to the ulti-
matum game is that in one treatment (the covered response treatment) the responder’s deci-
sion is not reported to the proposer immediately, while in a second treatment (the open re-
sponse treatment) it is. Rejections observed in the covered response treatment cannot be
interpreted as contributions to group reputation, whereas the fairness utility models cannot
explain differences across the two treatments. The former holds because group reputation is
void in the covered response treatment, in which proposers are informed on the rejections
only after the all decisions have been made in the experiment. The latter holds because there
are neither strategic nor payoff differences across treatments that would allow divergent
predictions by fairness utility models. The experimental results reported in this paper strongly
                                        
4  GNEEZY and STOLER (1998) show that in a one-shot situation, social punishment behavior can be observed
next to personal revenge.4
suggest that responders behavior is motivated both by resistance to unfairness and by contri-
bution to group reputation, but neither explanation is sufficient on its own.
2. Hypotheses
As mentioned, the covered response ultimatum game provides a qualitative test for some of
the features of static fairness utility models and dynamic adaptation approaches. More spe-
cifically, this study aims at presenting a test of the following two main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Resistance to Unfairness). Rejections are exclusively motivated by the fair-
ness of the final outcomes. No difference in rejection rates between the covered and the open
response treatment are expected.
Hypothesis 2 (Contribution to Group Reputation). Rejections are exclusively motivated by
group reputation considerations. No rejections are expected in the covered response treat-
ment. In the open response treatment, high rejection rates are expected in early rounds.
These rates are expected to decline towards the end of the experiment, as the advantage of
the group reputation diminishes.
The hypothesis of resistance to unfairness captures the motivational assumptions underlying
fairness utility models. In these models dynamic considerations are irrelevant. Only the fair-
ness of the final outcome - next to the own payoff - enters players’ utility or evaluation func-
tions. Since the responders have exactly the same choices and influence the final allocation in
exactly the same way in both treatments, the distribution of final allocations should be indis-
tinguishable in both treatments. Especially, the fact that the proposers in the covered response
treatment are not informed on who punished them in which round should not make a differ-
ence for the choices the responders make.5
The second hypothesis addresses a group reputation motive. Responders contribute to their
group’s reputation for being “tough” by punishing proposers who make unfair offers. Since a
proposer faces a much greater damage after the rejection of a low offer than the rejecting
responder does, proposers are likely to move towards more generous offers in the face of a
“tough” group of responders. Thus, the rejection of low offers can educate the proposer. In a
“meet only once” context, the rejection is not meant to enhance the rejecting responder’s pay-
off immediately by educating the particular proposer for later occasions when the two meet
again. Instead, educating proposers is a system of mutual contributions to a public good,
namely to the group reputation. On average, each responder benefits from the group reputa-
tion, i.e. indirectly benefits from the rejections.
5
The covered response ultimatum game separates the two hypotheses in the sense that rejec-
tions in the covered response treatment can be explained by hypothesis 1 but not by hypothe-
sis 2. Observing more rejections in the open than in the covered response treatment, however,
can be explained by hypothesis 2 but not by hypothesis 1. Our design is subtractive: In the
open response treatment, both motivations might be relevant and the two hypotheses do not
rule out one another. In the covered response treatment the group reputation motive is re-
moved from the game. We can interpret the rejection rate in this treatment as a basic rate of
resistance to unfairness. The difference in rejection rates is then the part added by the contri-
butions to group reputation.
3.  Model and Procedure
To simplify data analysis, we use a reduced version of the ultimatum game, similar to what
BOLTON and ZWICK (1995) introduced as the cardinal ultimatum game, or what GALE,
                                        
5  JACOBSEN and SADRIEH (1996) report that subjects in their video-taped group discussion experiments on the
one-shot trust game argue for “educating others” in the context of the “social supergame”.6
BINMORE, and SAMUELSON (1995) refer to as the ultimatum minigame. In our game, the pro-
poser is restricted to two alternatives: the equal split (5,5) or a division favoring himself (8,2).
The responder cannot reject the equal split. She can, however, choose to reject the unequal
offer, in which case both players receive nothing.
Compared to the standard ultimatum game, the reduced version used here allows simpler data
analysis. All relevant data appears in one number for each role: subjects’ behavior is ex-
pressed in proposer equal offer rates and responder rejection rates only. Previous experimen-
tal studies (BOLTON and ZWICK 1995, ABBINK, BOLTON, SADRIEH, and TANG 1996) have
shown that the reduced form ultimatum game captures the most relevant ultimatum game
characteristics.
The game tree of the game we used in the experiments is depicted in figure 1. It is the same
for the open and the covered response treatment. The difference between the treatments is
that in the covered response condition the responder’s choice was not reported to the pro-
poser. Only after the complete session, proposers in the covered response treatment were
informed about their earnings. From this information, they could derive how many times they
were punished, but not when and by whom. During the sessions no attribution whatsoever
could be made.
The experiments were computerized, with software developed using RatImage (ABBINK and
SADRIEH 1995). The game was presented to the subjects in the game tree form, where the
decisions were submitted by buttons at the branches of the tree. After a decision, the chosen
branch was highlighted, the other ones lowlighted. In the open response treatment, the re-
sponder’s choice and the resulting payoffs were immediately marked on the proposer’s
screen. In the covered response treatment, the proposer’s screen only displayed a question
mark between the two possible outcomes of that branch.7
Each subject played in the same role, proposer or responder, during the entire session. The
experiments were run using a revolving (or round-robin) matching scheme, such that each
proposer met each responder only once. This was particularly important for the control con-
dition with open responses. To ensure compatibility we used the same matching scheme in
the covered response treatment, too. Eight rounds were played with eight proposers and eight
responders.
Figure 1 here
Due to the revolving matching scheme, punishment cannot be applied to one’s own benefit. A
responder will never meet the same proposer again, thus she cannot punish a proposer in the
hope of getting a better offer from him in later rounds. Only as a group can the responders
hope to benefit from educative punishment. Thus, using the revolving matching scheme en-
sures that the motivation of group reputation cannot interfere with supergame effects.
Six sessions of each treatment were conducted, with a total of 192 subjects. The experiments
were run in the RatioLab at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and in the Laborato-
rium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung at the University of Bonn, Germany. In a two-
country experiment, the fact that the subjects in different countries are drawn from distinct
subject pools must be taken into account. Differences in behavior might arise from country-
specific cultural environments, but also from a different composition of the subject pools with
respect to educational background, gender, age, majors of study, and others. In fact, in the
four country study by ROTH, PRASNIKAR, OKUNO-FUJIWARA, and ZAMIR (1991), the Israeli
subjects’ behavior was slightly different from behavior in the other countries. In Jerusalem,
lower offers and a higher tendency to accept low offers were observed in the ultimatum
game. Thus, the possibility of subject pool differences must be taken into account. We con-
trolled for this possibility by splitting the two treatments between the two locations evenly.8
Three sessions of each treatment were run in each laboratory. Hence, if subject pool differ-
ences should exist, they cannot be in conflict with treatment differences.
All subjects were volunteers and were only given monetary incentives. The sessions started
with an introductory talk of about 10 minutes. The written instructions that were handed out
to the subjects are reproduced in appendix A. The sessions were conducted in the local lan-
guage of each country. Much care was taken to ensure that the instructions were equivalent in
both countries. The instructions were first written in English and then translated into each
local language by a member of the local laboratory team. In the next step, another team
member translated the translation back into English, without seeing the original English text.
This procedure was repeated until the back-translation and the original text had converged.
Convergence, however, was reached rather quickly, since a very neutral and technical phras-
ing was used. The same method was applied to the screen output, which was also displayed in
the local language of each country. The main decision screens are reproduced in appendix A.
The social composition of the two subject pools was similar, since both laboratories are lo-
cated in social science buildings and both subject pools mainly consisted of students of social
sciences. The exchange rates of points to cash were adjusted in the two countries in a way
that total earnings were comparable, in terms of teaching assistants’ average hourly wage
rates at each location. The exchange rate of DM 0.50 (roughly US-$ 0.33 at that time) per
point was used in Bonn, and NIS 0.75 (about US-$ 0.25 at that time) was used in Jerusalem.
Since the experiments were short (about 30-45 minutes in total), the resulting payoffs were
on average well above the typical student’s per hour wage.9
4.  Results
First, we focus on the responder behavior. We begin with the analysis of aggregate rejection
rates over the sessions. The raw data of the experiment are reproduced in appendix B.
4.1.   Responder Rejection Rates
Table 1 shows the average overall rejection rates (rejected unequal offers to total unequal
offers) in the six sessions of each treatment, ordered from the lowest to the highest. The Jeru-
salem sessions are marked with a cross, the Bonn sessions with an asterisk.
Table 1.  Average rates of rejected unequal offers in each session (in percent)
Covered 6.5
+ 17.6* 22.7
+ 26.1* 31.0* 31.3
+ ˘=22.5
Open 10.0
+ 20.0* 40.0* 43.5* 50.0
+ 80.0
+ ˘=40.6
The rejection rates show that, even when the response is not reported to the proposer, almost
one quarter of all unequal offers are turned down. This is clear evidence for responders’ re-
sistance to unfairness that is entirely independent of all considerations of monetary payoff
maximization. Responders cannot openly punish proposers in the covered response treatment
- not even as a group - in order to receive higher payoffs later. Thus, the relatively high aver-
age rejection rate (22.5%) is evidently motivated by negative emotions towards unfair actions
or distributions. Responders are willing to pay a price solely to soothe their anger concerning
the proposer’s greed. The disutility of unfair outcomes that in some way or another is con-
tained in all fairness utility models can be interpreted as a formalization of such an emotional
component.
Observation 1.  In the covered response treatment, substantially positive rejection rates are
observed.10
However, fairness utility models do not explain a different aspect of our data. There is a signifi-
cant difference in the rejection rates of the two treatments. The average rejection rates of the
open response condition are about 75% higher than those of the covered treatment. The differ-
ence is significant with a p-value of 0.051, according to the Mann-Whitney U-test applied to the
average rates of rejection in sessions. The extent to which more rejections are observed in the
open response treatment must be attributed to the visibility of the rejection. The difference
caused by visibility could be based on the fact that visibility turns rejection into an act of reci-
procal punishment. Since visibility allows that the reciprocation can uniquely be ascribed to the
reciprocating subject, the connection between punisher, the reason for punishment, and the
addressee of the punishment becomes unambiguous. This - in a second step of reasoning - al-
lows for an immediate perception of the educational goal of punishment by the proposers.
Observation 2.  In the open treatment, unequal offers are rejected significantly more often
than in the covered treatment.
In this sense, the visibility of punishment enables responders to educate proposers with each
rejection of an unfair offer and, thus, to build up a group reputation of being “tough”. Obvi-
ously, proposers facing a group of “tough” responders will tend to switch to more equal split
offers. A similar type of behavior is reported by WINTER and ZAMIR (1996). The notion of
group reputation is well in line with the hypothesis of population rationality put forward in
that work.
4.2  Does Behavior Change Over Time?
Figure 2 shows the aggregate rejection rates over the eight rounds of the experiment. It is
consistent with the group reputation hypothesis that the differences between the rejection
rates across treatments diminish towards the end of the session: in the last two rounds, when11
contributing to group reputation makes little or no sense, almost no difference between the
treatments can be observed.
Figure 2 here
The fact that average rejection rates get closer to one another is mainly due to the tendency of
the rejection rates in the open response treatment to fall over time. From the first to the sec-
ond half of a session (four rounds each), the aggregate rejection rate falls from 39.8% to
29.1% in the open response treatment. The decrease is significant at p = 0.015, according to
the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test, applied to the difference of rejection rates be-
tween the first and the second half of the experiment in the six independent sessions. In con-
trast, the rejection rates in the covered response treatment fall only slightly (from 24.2% to
21.4%), and the decrease is not significant. The corresponding numbers for the single ses-
sions are shown in the following table 2.
Table 2.  Rejection rates in the first and the second half of the experiment
Open treatment Covered treatment
Session Rounds
1-4
Rounds
5-8
D Rounds
1-4
Rounds
5-8
D
1*
2*
3*
4
+
5
+
6
+
0.44
0.18
0.44
0.52
0.82
0.18
0.43
0.21
0.40
0.43
0.75
0.07
!0.01
+0.03
!0.04
!0.09
!0.07
!0.11
0.38
0.33
0.19
0.20
0.29
0.13
0.23
0.29
0.17
0.25
0.33
0.00
!0.15
!0.04
!0.02
+0.05
+0.04
!0.13
Average
Aggregate
0.43
0.40
0.38
0.29
!0.05
!0.11
0.25
0.25
0.21
0.21
!0.04
!0.04
*= Bonn session       
+= Jerusalem session
Observation 3. In the open treatment, responder rejection rates fall significantly from the
first to the second half of the experiment. In the covered treatment, no trend can be detected.12
This result, together with the result that average rejection rates over the complete sessions in
the covered response treatment are significantly lower than those in the open response treat-
ment, leads to the following conclusion: The fairly stable rate of rejections in all rounds of
the covered response treatment reflects a basic rate of rejections due to resistance to unfair-
ness in our subject pool. The higher rates of rejection in the early rounds of the open response
treatment appear to incorporate some amount of rejections motivated by group reputation in
addition to the basic rate of rejections due to resistance to unfairness. Towards the end of the
sessions, under the open response condition, the added rate of rejections motivated by group
reputation decreases, leading to the observed decrease in the difference between the total
rejection rates of the two treatments.
4.3.  Proposer Equal Offer Rates
In figure 3, the round by round aggregate equal offer rates are depicted. Table 3 shows the
session averages equal offers rates, ordered from the smallest to the largest. Again, Jerusalem
sessions are marked with a cross, and Bonn sessions with an asterisk.
Table 3.  Average rates of equal offers in each session (in percent)
Covered 31.3
+ 46.9* 50.0
+ 51.6
+ 54.7* 64.1* ˘=49.8
Open 21.9* 21.9* 21.9
+ 28.1* 43.8
+ 76.6
+ ˘=35.7
In the covered response treatment, we observe equal offers in half of the cases. This rate is about
40% higher than in the open response treatment. Aggregated over all eight rounds, the difference
across treatments is significant at p = 0.026 (one-tailed), according to the Mann-Whitney U-test,
applied to average equal offer rates in the sessions.13
Already in the very first round, we observe a higher equal offer rate in the covered response
treatment. 70.8% of the proposers choose an equal offer in the first round, whereas 50.0% do
so in the open response treatment. According to Fisher’s exact test, this difference is signifi-
cant at p = 0.019 (one-tailed). Note that the individuals’ equal offers are independent in the
very first round of the experiment.
Observation 4.  The equal offer rates are significantly higher in the covered response treat-
ment than in the open response treatment.
It is interesting that the equal offer rates in the covered response treatment are significantly
higher than in the open treatment, although the rejection rates of unequal offers are lower. It
seems plausible that the high equal offer rates in the covered response treatment are due to an
enhanced risk avoidance of the proposers. If a proposer makes an unequal offer, his payoff
can vary between 0 and 8, depending on the responder’s choice. In contrast, he is guaranteed
a payoff of 5 when making an equal offer. Thus, if the proposer believes that there is a posi-
tive probability for some responders to reject the unequal offer, the payoff on the right branch
is uncertain, with an unknown probability, whereas the payoff on the left branch is certain.
Figure 3 here
To explain the discrepancy in proposers’ first round behavior across treatments, the following
behavioral hypothesis seems suitable: Subjects proposing in the open response treatment tend
to test responders’ propensity to reject by selecting the unequal offer branch. Learning from
success and failure, however, is completely impossible for proposers in the covered response
treatment. It seems that the lack of feedback increases the tendency to avoid risk and leads to
the significantly higher equal offer rates in the entire session in the covered response treat-
ment.14
4.4.  Is Group Reputation Effective?
Given that responders in the open response treatment use punishment to building up a group
reputation for being “tough”, the question arises whether their attempt is successful. Do early
rejections actually induce proposers to shy away from the unequal offer, because of the ex-
pectation of punishment? If the answer is “yes”, then we should observe an increase of equal
offer rates in those proposer populations that faced the highest rejection rates. For each ses-
sion, we examine the rejection rates in the first half of the experiment and the change of equal
offer rates from the first to the second half. We compute the correlation of these two meas-
ures over the sessions. If group reputation building is effective, then a tendency for high first
half rejection rates to be followed by high increases in equal offer rates should be observed.
Figure 4 shows that, in fact, there is a strong correlation in the predicted direction. The greater
the responders’ reluctance to accept unfair offers, the greater is the rise in the frequency of equal
offers with time. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient of rs = 0.93 is significantly different
from zero at " = 0.05 (one-tailed). Thus, high frequencies of rejections correlate to higher in-
creases in equal offer rates.
Figure 4 here
We now examine whether the positive correlation between rejection rates and the change in
equal offer rates can be detected on the individual level. To see this, we check each round in
which a proposer switches from a preceding round’s unequal to a current round’s equal offer.
We count how often the equal offer was made after the last round’s unequal offer was re-
jected, and compare this to the frequency of equal offers following an accepted unequal offer.
If proposers were successfully educated with rejections, then we should observe systemati-
cally more switches after punishments than after accepted unequal offers.15
Figure 5 shows that the group reputation building is actually effective on the individual level.
Observing a rejection, i.e. being punished, influences the proposers’ behavior. Proposers’
propensities to choose the equal offer is rather low if their unequal offer in the last round was
accepted (relative frequency 11.4%). But, if punished, their tendencies to switch is almost
four times higher (relative frequency 44.3%). This is consistent with the hypothesis that pro-
posers in the open response treatment attempt to test the probability of rejection and switch to
the equal offer if that probability is perceived as high.
The observed pattern of switches points in the same direction in all six sessions of the open
response treatment. Table 4 shows the frequencies of switches after punishments and after ac-
cepted unequal offers. The last column shows the difference between the relative frequencies of
switches. In all six sessions this measure has a positive value. Thus, a switch occurs relatively
more often after rejected than after accepted unequal offers. The matched-pair sign test, applied
to the difference between switches after punishment and switches after accepted unequal offers
in a session, rejects the null hypothesis that a positive difference is as likely as a negative one at
p = 0.016 (one-tailed).
Observation 5.  In the open treatment, proposers tend to switch to the equal offer signifi-
cantly more often after having observed a rejection than after accepted unequal offers.
Table 4.   Frequency of switches from the unequal of the equal offer
Session Switch after
Rejection
(1)
Rejections
Rounds 1-7
(2)
Switch after
Accepted offer
(3)
Accepted offers
rounds 1-7
(4)
Difference in
rel. frequency
(1)/(2)-(3)/(4)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2
5
8
11
2
17
10
18
17
12
5
3
2
3
4
1
3
24
33
26
17
3
37
+0.29
+0.14
+0.16
+0.24
+0.58
+0.32
S 35 79 16 140 +0.3316
After having switched to an equal offer, proposers often switch back. Of all equal offers, 46%
are followed by an unequal offer. Thus, although proposers do react to punishment, they also
show a strong tendency to switch back to the unequal offer. This implies that high rejection
rates are necessary for a sustained group reputation effect on the responders side. Interest-
ingly, the frequency of switching from the equal to the unequal offer is almost the same in
both treatments: under the covered condition we observe a relative frequency of 47%.
Figure 5 here
The results show that proposers in fact tend to react to punishment in a manner that is favor-
able to the responders. If responders anticipate such behavior, it can be reasonable for them to
contribute to the group reputation by rejecting unequal offers. Of course, when applying
punishment as a means of group reputation building, responders are in a social dilemma
situation. Due to the revolving matching scheme of the experiment, no responder can profit
immediately from her own rejection. She can only benefit from other responders’ contribu-
tions to the group reputation, and others will benefit from her contribution. The revolving
matching scheme eliminates supergame effects that are inherent to repeated play on individ-
ual level. On group level, however, the revolving matching scheme creates a public good
situation, in which each rejection of an unfair offer contributes further to the reputation of the
group members for being “tough”. 4.5.  Are Contributions to Group Reputation Profitable?
We have found evidence that contributions to the group reputation are effective in the sense
that proposers are influenced towards making more equal offers, after having observed rejec-
tions. However, since rejections are costly for the responders, the effectiveness of such edu-
cative punishment does not immediately imply that such behavior is profitable for responder
populations. In this section, we analyze how rejection rates and responder profits are distrib-
uted over the populations.17
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the rejection rates in a session and the average re-
sponder payoff (in per cent of the cake) in that session. The numbers are computed on the
basis of all eight rounds of the session. If contributing to the group reputation is profitable,
then we should observe higher responder payoffs in the sessions with high rejection rates.
The correlation between responder payoff and rejection rates seems to be U-shaped rather
than monotonously rising or falling. It seems that the more extreme patterns of behavior are
more profitable than those in between. Contributing to the group reputation seems to be prof-
itable only if the rejection rates are sufficiently high to induce a strong effect. Where the
rejection rates are intermediate, the responders pay the price for punishment, but the fre-
quency of unequal offers is not sufficiently decreased to compensate the costs of punishment.
To illustrate this point, we have included the vertical line into the figure. At a rejection rate of
0.375, expected payoff maximizing proposers are exactly indifferent between the equal and
the unequal offer. Thus, rejection rates close to that line are least profitable. The very low and
especially the very high rejection rates are preferable for payoff maximizing responder
populations. However, it should be noticed that the data basis is too small to provide clear
statistical evidence for this effect.
Figure 6 here
4.6.  Do Contributions to Group Reputation Increase Efficiency?
Efficiency in our context can simply be understood as the total payoff gained by responders
and proposers in a session together. Obviously every rejection reduces the total payoff in a
round. The efficiency loss, in points, is exactly the absolute overall number of rejections in a
session, multiplied by the cake size of 10. On the other hand, if the proposers are successfully
educated by high early rejection rates to increase the number of equal offers, the total number
of rejections of a session may be small, since the absolute number of unequal offers is re-18
duced. Hence, if the effect of early punishment is strong enough, then high rejection rates in
the beginning of a session need not necessarily lead to less efficiency than in a session with a
constant moderate rate of unequal offers and rejections.
In figure 7, average proposer payoffs are depicted on the x-axis and the average responder
payoffs on the y-axis. The dots mark the average responder and proposer payoffs in the ses-
sions, where the size of the dots correspond to the average rejection rate in that session. The
diagonal lines are iso-efficiency lines. Different points on the same iso-efficiency line repre-
sent allocations with the same efficiency, but a different distribution between proposers and
responders. It can be seen that not only the average responder payoff, but also efficiency is
lowest with intermediate rejection rates. The highest efficiency is achieved in the session with
the lowest rejection rate, where, evidently, most of the efficiency gain is extracted by the
proposers. Thus, high rejection rates have a similar effect on efficiency as on responder pay-
offs. If rejection rates are intermediate, then the contributions to group reputation are too
small to outweigh the efficiency losses caused by the rejections. However, we must once
again point out that the data basis is small and no conclusive inference can be drawn.
Observation 6.  The highest responder payoffs and the highest efficiency are observed in the
sessions in which rejection rates are either very low or very high.
Finally, in figure 7, it can immediately be noticed that efficiency in the covered treatment is
greater than in the open treatment. This is due to the lower rejection rates coinciding with
higher equal offer rates. The difference is significant at p = 0.017 (one-tailed) according to
the Mann-Whitney U-test applied to the average per round total payoff in the single inde-
pendent sessions.
Figure 7 here19
5.  Summary and Conclusions
We conducted an experiment using a simple ultimatum game. Our two-treatment design
enabled us to separate a base rate of rejections motivated by responders’ resistance to unfair-
ness from an additional rate of rejections that seems to have been motivated by group repu-
tation building.
In our open response treatment, the responder’s choice was reported to the proposer, while it
was not reported in the covered response treatment. Rejection rates in the covered response
treatment - with an average of 23.3% - were considerable. Since rejections in the covered
response treatment can neither have been motivated by individual nor group reputation
building, we conclude that the high rejection rates in these sessions are due to the responders’
inherent resistance to unfairness. This result is completely in line with the central assumption
of fairness utility models, such as those suggested by BOLTON (1991), RABIN (1993), BOLTON
and OCKENFELS (1999), and FEHR and SCHMIDT (1999).
The significant difference in rejection behavior across treatments, however, is not compatible
with any of the mentioned fairness utility models. We observed a significantly higher rate of
rejections in the open response treatment than in the covered response treatment. This obser-
vation led to the conclusion that rejections in the open response treatment are not only moti-
vated by responders’ resistance to unfairness, but are also contributions to the group’s repu-
tation for being “tough”. In the context of our experiment, in which each responder met each
proposer only once, building up an individually profitable reputation was impossible. But, by
building up a group reputation for rejecting unfair offers, the group of responders attempted
and managed to influence the behavior of the group of proposers in direction of more equal
offers.20
The dynamics of rejection behavior provided more evidence for our conclusion. The average
per round rejection rates in the open response treatment decreased in the last rounds of each
experimental session, as contributing to the group reputation had less and less potential im-
pact. In the very last rounds, these rates actually approached the average rejection rate of the
covered response treatment, which stayed around 23% and exhibited no time trend. This
evidence suggests that there is a basic rate of rejections in ultimatum game behavior that is
due to the responders’ resistance to unfairness. This basic rate corresponds to the rate of
rejections in the covered response treatment and in the last rounds of the open response
treatment. The excess of the rejection rates over the basic rate in the early rounds of the open
response treatment can be attributed to contributions of the responders to the reputation of
their group for being “tough”.
After finding that responders are willing to contribute to their group’s reputation, it seems
natural to ask whether building up such a group reputation is effective and profitable for the
responders. The answer our data gives is partially as expected and partially quite surprising.
On the one hand, we find that almost all proposers react as expected: when facing a group of
“tough” responders, proposers make equal offers significantly more often than when facing
“compliant” responders. On the other hand, it seems surprising that, although proposers react
to punishment as expected,  only extreme rejection behavior leads to higher profits for the
responders. In other words, responders fare best, either if they are very “compliant” or if they
are very strict in rejecting unequal offers. The responder groups that only occasionally reject
unfair offers, end up paying more for these rejections than they gain from the positive reac-
tion of the proposers. Thus, rejecting unequal offers is always effective, but is not always
profitable or efficient. Building up a “tough” group reputation only pays, if enough unequal
offers are rejected early on.21
Finally, we observe that significantly more equal offers are made by proposers in the open
than in the covered treatment. Our conjecture is that proposers in early rounds of the open
treatment “test” responders’ reactions to unequal offers. In the covered treatment, such testing
is not possible. This seems to explain the significantly higher number of unequal first round
offers in the open compared to the covered response treatment.
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Appendix A.  The Written Instructions
Player Types:
There are two types in the experiment: player 1 and player 2.
After the introduction, each participant draws one of 16 cards.
The drawn card defines the terminal number of the participant.
The terminal number determines the participant's type for the whole experiment.
Structure:
The experiment consists of eight rounds.
In each round 8 pairs of participants are formed:
each pair with one player 1 and one player 2.
In every round, every player 1 meets a different player 2, and vice versa.
Thus, no participant meets the same participant a second time.
The participants are not allowed to speak with each other during the experiment.
Decisions:
Each round begins with player 1 choosing one of two alternatives: Left or Right.
Player 2 is informed about the choice of player 1.
If player 1 chooses Left, the round ends.
If player 1 chooses Right, player 2 chooses one of two alternatives: Left or Right;
player 1 is not informed about the choice of player 2;
then the round ends.
Profits in Points:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 receives Player 2 receives
chooses Left has no choice 5 5
chooses Right chooses Left 8 2
chooses Right chooses Right 0 0
The Question Mark:
If player 1 chooses Right, he will only see a question mark on the screen: since he will
  not be informed about the choice of player 2, he will neither know his own profit,
nor the profit of player 2.
After the last round of the experiment all participants will be informed of their total
profits, but the players 1 will not be informed of the value of each received ?
separately.
Exchange Rate:
Each point earned in the experiment is equivalent to 50 pfennigs / 75 Agorot.24
The Decision Screen for Player 1
Player 1 chooses one of his al-
ternatives by clicking the corre-
sponding mousebutton on the
screen, or by pressing the corre-
sponding key on the keyboard
("L" for "Left", "R" for "Right",
resp.).
The Decision Screens for Player 2
If player 1 has chosen "Left",
then player 2 is informed about
player 1's choice, but has no own
decision to make.
If player 1 has chosen "Right",
then player 2 chooses one of his
alternatives by clicking the cor-
responding mousebutton on the
screen, or by pressing the corre-
sponding key on the keyboard
("L" for "Left", "R" for "Right",
resp.).25
Appendix B:  The Data
Session 1: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11R 15R | 13R  3L |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17L  6  | 12R  5L | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11L  3  | 13R  1R |  8R  9R | 14R  6L | 17L  5  | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1R | 13R  9R |  8L  6  | 14L  5  | 17R  7L | 12R 16L | 18L 15  |
4 |  2L  1  | 11L  9  | 13R  6L |  8L  5  | 14R  7L | 17L 16  | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  8R  7L | 14L 16  | 17L 15  | 12L  3  | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  8R 16L | 14R 15R | 17R  3L | 12L  1  | 18L  9  |
7 |  2L  5  | 11L  7  | 13L 16  |  8L 15  | 14L  3  | 17L  1  | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13L 15  |  8R  3L | 14R  1R | 17R  9R | 12L  6  | 18L  5  |
Session 2: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11L 15  | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14L  9  | 17L  6  | 12L  5  | 18L  7  |
2 |  2L 15  | 11L  3  | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14L  6  | 17L  5  | 12L  7  | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1R | 13R  9L |  8R  6L | 14L  5  | 17R  7L | 12R 16L | 18R 15L |
4 |  2R  1R | 11L  9  | 13L  6  |  8R  5R | 14L  7  | 17L 16  | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5R |  8R  7R | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12R  3R | 18L  1  |
6 |  2L  6  | 11L  5  | 13L  7  |  8L 16  | 14R 15L | 17L  3  | 12L  1  | 18R  9L |
7 |  2L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R 16L |  8R 15L | 14R  3R | 17R  1L | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2L  7  | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8L  3  | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12L  6  | 18L  5  |
Session 3: Covered, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11L 15  | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17L  6  | 12L  5  | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14R  6L | 17L  5  | 12L  7  | 18R 16L |
3 |  2R  3L | 11R  1L | 13L  9  |  8R  6R | 14R  5R | 17L  7  | 12R 16R | 18R 15L |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13L  6  |  8L  5  | 14R  7L | 17L 16  | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  8R  7L | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12L  3  | 18R  1L |
6 |  2L  6  | 11R  5R | 13R  7L |  8L 16  | 14L 15  | 17L  3  | 12L  1  | 18L  9  |
7 |  2R  5R | 11R  7L | 13L 16  |  8L 15  | 14L  3  | 17R  1L | 12L  9  | 18L  6  |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12R  6R | 18R  5L |
Session 4: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15R  4L | 11L  2  | 13L  3  |  9R  1L | 14R  8L | 16L  6  | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15L  2  | 11R  3L | 13L  1  |  9R  8R | 14R  6L | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4L |
3 | 15R  3L | 11L  1  | 13R  8L |  9R  6L | 14R  5R | 16R  7L | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15L  1  | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9R  5R | 14R  7R | 16R  4L | 12R  2L | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8R | 11L  6  | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14R  4L | 16L  2  | 12R  3L | 10R  1R |
6 | 15R  6L | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  9R  4L | 14R  2L | 16R  3L | 12R  1R | 10L  8  |
7 | 15L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9R  2L | 14R  3L | 16R  1R | 12R  8R | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11R  4L | 13R  2L |  9R  3L | 14R  1R | 16R  8L | 12R  6L | 10L  5  |
Session 5: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9R  1L | 14L  8  | 16L  6  | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2R | 11R  3R | 13R  1L |  9R  8L | 14R  6L | 16L  5  | 12R  7L | 10L  4  |
3 | 15L  3  | 11L  1  | 13R  8R |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7L | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9R  5L | 14R  7R | 16L  4  | 12R  2R | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14L  4  | 16R  2R | 12L  3  | 10L  1  |
6 | 15L  6  | 11L  5  | 13R  7R |  9L  4  | 14R  2L | 16L  3  | 12R  1L | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R  4R |  9L  2  | 14R  3L | 16L  1  | 12L  8  | 10L  6  |
8 | 15R  7R | 11R  4R | 13R  2L |  9L  3  | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10L  5  |
Session 6: Covered, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9L  1  | 14L  8  | 16R  6R | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9L  8  | 14R  6L | 16L  5  | 12R  7L | 10L  4  |
3 | 15L  3  | 11L  1  | 13R  8L |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7R | 12R  4L | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8L | 13R  6L |  9L  5  | 14L  7  | 16L  4  | 12R  2L | 10L  3  |
5 | 15L  8  | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9L  7  | 14L  4  | 16R  2L | 12R  3L | 10L  1  |
6 | 15R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16R  3L | 12R  1L | 10L  8  |
7 | 15L  5  | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9L  2  | 14R  3L | 16R  1L | 12R  8L | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11L  4  | 13R  2L |  9L  3  | 14R  1L | 16L  8  | 12R  6L | 10L  5  |26
Session 7: Open, Bonn
1 |  2L 16  | 11R 15L | 13L  3  |  8L  1  | 14R  9L | 17R  6L | 12R  5R | 18R  7L |
2 |  2R 15R | 11R  3R | 13R  1R |  8R  9L | 14R  6L | 17R  5R | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2L  3  | 11R  1L | 13L  9  |  8R  6L | 14R  5R | 17R  7L | 12R 16R | 18R 15R |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13R  6L |  8R  5R | 14R  7L | 17R 16R | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2L  9  | 11R  6L | 13R  5R |  8R  7L | 14R 16R | 17L 15  | 12R  3R | 18R  1L |
6 |  2R  6L | 11R  5L | 13L  7  |  8R 16R | 14R 15L | 17R  3R | 12L  1  | 18R  9L |
7 |  2L  5  | 11R  7L | 13L 16  |  8R 15L | 14R  3R | 17L  1  | 12L  9  | 18R  6L |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16R | 13L 15  |  8R  3R | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12L  6  | 18R  5R |
Session 8: Open, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11R 15L | 13R  3L |  8L  1  | 14L  9  | 17L  6  | 12R  5L | 18L  7  |
2 |  2R 15L | 11R  3R | 13R  1L |  8L  9  | 14R  6L | 17R  5L | 12R  7L | 18L 16  |
3 |  2R  3L | 11R  1L | 13R  9L |  8R  6L | 14R  5R | 17L  7  | 12R 16R | 18L 15  |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9L | 13R  6L |  8R  5L | 14L  7  | 17R 16L | 12R 15R | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11R  6R | 13R  5R |  8R  7L | 14R 16L | 17L 15  | 12R  3L | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6R | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  8R 16R | 14R 15L | 17R  3R | 12R  1L | 18R  9L |
7 |  2R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R 16R |  8R 15L | 14R  3L | 17L  1  | 12R  9L | 18R  6L |
8 |  2R  7L | 11R 16L | 13R 15L |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17L  9  | 12R  6L | 18R  5L |
Session 9: Open, Bonn
1 |  2R 16L | 11R 15L | 13L  3  |  8R  1L | 14L  9  | 17R  6R | 12R  5L | 18R  7R |
2 |  2R 15L | 11L  3  | 13R  1L |  8R  9L | 14R  6R | 17R  5L | 12R  7R | 18R 16L |
3 |  2R  3R | 11R  1L | 13R  9L |  8R  6R | 14L  5  | 17R  7R | 12R 16R | 18L 15  |
4 |  2R  1L | 11R  9R | 13R  6R |  8R  5L | 14R  7R | 17R 16L | 12L 15  | 18L  3  |
5 |  2R  9L | 11L  6  | 13R  5L |  8R  7R | 14L 16  | 17R 15L | 12R  3L | 18L  1  |
6 |  2R  6R | 11R  5L | 13R  7R |  8R 16R | 14L 15  | 17R  3R | 12R  1L | 18L  9  |
7 |  2R  5L | 11R  7R | 13R 16L |  8R 15L | 14R  3L | 17R  1L | 12R  9L | 18R  6R |
8 |  2R  7R | 11L 16  | 13L 15  |  8R  3L | 14R  1L | 17R  9L | 12R  6R | 18R  5L |
Session 10: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15R  4L | 11L  2  | 13L  3  |  9R  1L | 14L  8  | 16R  6R | 12R  5L | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2R | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9R  8R | 14L  6  | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4R |
3 | 15R  3L | 11R  1R | 13R  8L |  9R  6L | 14R  5R | 16R  7L | 12R  4R | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1L | 11R  8R | 13R  6R |  9L  5  | 14R  7R | 16R  4R | 12R  2R | 10L  3  |
5 | 15R  8R | 11L  6  | 13L  5  |  9L  7  | 14L  4  | 16L  2  | 12L  3  | 10R  1L |
6 | 15R  6L | 11L  5  | 13R  7L |  9R  4L | 14L  2  | 16R  3R | 12L  1  | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5R | 11L  7  | 13R  4R |  9R  2R | 14L  3  | 16L  1  | 12R  8L | 10R  6L |
8 | 15R  7L | 11L  4  | 13L  2  |  9R  3L | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10R  5R |
Session 11: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3R |  9R  1R | 14L  8  | 16L  6  | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3R | 13L  1  |  9L  8  | 14L  6  | 16R  5R | 12R  7R | 10L  4  |
3 | 15R  3R | 11L  1  | 13L  8  |  9R  6R | 14L  5  | 16L  7  | 12L  4  | 10L  2  |
4 | 15R  1R | 11L  8  | 13R  6L |  9L  5  | 14R  7R | 16L  4  | 12L  2  | 10L  3  |
5 | 15L  8  | 11L  6  | 13R  5R |  9R  7R | 14L  4  | 16L  2  | 12L  3  | 10L  1  |
6 | 15L  6  | 11L  5  | 13L  7  |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16L  3  | 12L  1  | 10L  8  |
7 | 15R  5R | 11L  7  | 13R  4L |  9L  2  | 14L  3  | 16L  1  | 12L  8  | 10L  6  |
8 | 15L  7  | 11L  4  | 13L  2  |  9L  3  | 14L  1  | 16L  8  | 12L  6  | 10L  5  |
Session 12: Open, Jerusalem
1 | 15L  4  | 11L  2  | 13R  3L |  9R  1R | 14L  8  | 16R  6L | 12L  5  | 10L  7  |
2 | 15R  2L | 11R  3L | 13R  1L |  9L  8  | 14R  6L | 16R  5L | 12L  7  | 10R  4L |
3 | 15R  3L | 11R  1R | 13R  8L |  9L  6  | 14R  5L | 16R  7R | 12R  4L | 10R  2L |
4 | 15R  1L | 11L  8  | 13R  6R |  9R  5L | 14L  7  | 16R  4L | 12R  2L | 10R  3L |
5 | 15R  8L | 11R  6L | 13R  5L |  9R  7L | 14L  4  | 16R  2L | 12R  3L | 10R  1L |
6 | 15L  6  | 11R  5L | 13R  7L |  9L  4  | 14L  2  | 16R  3L | 12R  1R | 10R  8L |
7 | 15R  5L | 11R  7L | 13R  4L |  9R  2L | 14R  3L | 16R  1L | 12R  8L | 10R  6L |
8 | 15R  7L | 11R  4L | 13R  2L |  9R  3L | 14R  1R | 16R  8L | 12R  6L | 10R  5L |
Legend:27
Each line represents one round of the session. Each column stands for one match. For exam-
ple,  “15 R   4 L“ reads: terminal 15, proposer, chose Right, terminal 4, responder, chose Left.P
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